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GRAEME S. MOUNT
MAINE AND THE END OF RECIPROCITY IN 1866
Portland’s development in the nineteenth century owed 
much to the economic strategies adopted by its leading mer­
chants and politicians. In the prosperous years following 
statehood, the city benefited enormously from the burgeoning 
West Indies trade. By midcentury the coastwise exchange of 
timber, rum, and sugar had tapered off, and the city looked to 
new methods for maintaining its commercial strength. Build­
ing on Portland’s mercantile heritage, city leaders turned to 
railroads, and especially rail links with Canada, as a means to 
continue the flow of trade through the city. Continental eco­
nomic integration — stronger trade links between Canada and 
the northeastern United States — promised new returns on 
Portland’s traditional commercial advantages.
The key to linking Canadian trade to Portland’s port 
facilities was the Atlantic and St. Lawrence Railroad, officially 
opened on July 18,1853. The new line, which joined Montreal 
and Portland, resulted from the entrepreneurial and promo­
tional energies of Portland’s John Alfred Poor, William Pitt 
Preble, and Josiah S. Little and those of Montreal businessman 
Alexander Tilloch Galt. The railroad’s promoters had high­
lighted the advantages for both cities. Since the St. Lawrence 
River was clogged by ice for roughly half of each year, the 
railroad offered Montreal an alternative to winter isolation; the 
terminus at Portland would be the western city’s outlet to the 
rest of the world. For Montreal, Portland was closer by half a 
day to Great Britain than Boston, and two days nearer than 
New York. As the railroad became an important part of the 
Portland economy, Montreal could hope to exert more influ­
ence in Portland than in larger Boston or New York. As for
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Portland's growth in the nineteenth century reflected its changing commercial advantages. 
As transportation moved from sailing ships to steam and finally railroads, c ity leaders 
adopted strategies that kept Portland at the center of regional trade flows. Trade with Canada 
was an im portant part of their response. Maine Historical Society (MHS) photo.
Portland, located as it was on the periphery of major United 
States trade flows, its proximity to the Canadian heartland was 
an appealing opportunity for growth.
Government and business found the money and built the 
line. Three weeks after the opening, Canada’s Grand Trunk 
Railway leased the American portion, known as the Atlantic 
and St. Lawrence Railroad, for 999 years. Stability seemed 
assured.1 Indeed, over the next ten years Portland boomed 
because of the connection. Between 1850 and 1860 Portland’s 
population increased from 21,000 to 26,000. The twenty-fifth 
largest city in the United States before 1853, Portland became 
the twenty-third.2 By one estimate, in 1864 alone more than 
500,000 barrels of Canadian flour and 1,000,000 bushels of 
wheat left Canada for trans-Atlantic markets via Portland. The
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transshipment business, which involved a variety of subsidiary 
activities such as the maintenance of grain elevators, port facili­
ties, and commercial establishments, was a tremendous boon to 
the local economy.3
The impact of the new rail line demonstrated to Portland 
leaders that continental economic integration was the key to 
the city’s commercial future. For J. A. Poor, the Atlantic and St. 
Lawrence was only a beginning. His much more daring plan 
for a second railroad, the European and North American, 
called for a line running east from Portland through New 
Brunswick, peninsular Nova Scotia, and perhaps Cape Breton 
Island, enabling travelers to shave additional days off their 
trans-Atlantic crossings. Given better rail links between Maine 
and Canada, geography could once again work to Portland’s 
advantage.
T he commercial and railroad history of Portland, how­
ever, highlights a curious inconsistency in Maine politics in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Given the impor­
tance of the Canadian connection to Maine’s largest urban 
community, one might reasonably look for strong political 
support in Maine for diplomatic ties binding the two nations 
more securely. Such support, however, was not to be found. In 
fact, key politicians from Maine were vocal in their opposition 
to the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 and were indifferent to the 
possibility that its abrogation in 1866 might stimulate British 
North Americans into greater commercial self-reliance at 
Portland’s expense. The Reciprocity Treaty, concluded June 5, 
1854, between Secretary of State William Marcy and Lord 
Elgin, Governor-General of British North America, eliminated 
tariffs on products of farms, forests, fisheries, and mines as they 
crossed the boundary between British North America and the 
United States. It allowed United States citizens and British 
North Americans freer access to each other’s fisheries and water 
arteries.4 The purpose of this article is to explain why many 
Maine politicians wanted an end to reciprocity in spite of its 
seeming importance to the state’s key commercial port.
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Completion of the Atlantic and St. Lawrence Railroad, linking Montreal and 
Portland, brought a flury of activity to the Forest City. Construction of new 
shipping facilities continued to change the Portland cityscape into the twen­
tieth century, as this early scene shows. MSH photo.
What exactly did reciprocity offer to Maine’s economy? 
Continental economic integration unquestionably did prom­
ise benefits, and historians have argued that, directly or indi­
rectly, abrogation in 1866 was indeed harmful to the interests of 
people in Maine. In particular, abrogation added fuel to the 
movement for Confederation, which followed less than sixteen 
months after the reciprocity agreements ended. Writing in 
1926, railroad historian Edward Chase argued that without 
Confederation Canadians would not have organized the Cana­
dian Pacific Railway, which bypassed Portland as Canada's 
Atlantic port. Given Portland's proximity to Montreal, Chase 
was convinced that on economic grounds Portland should have 
been the CPR’s Atlantic terminus. For political reasons alone, 
the CPR went to Saint John, New Brunswick, instead.5 A later 
treatment of the reciprocity question pointed out that abroga­
tion “became a decided disadvantage” to the line between
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Montreal and Portland.6 Passports, required of anyone cross­
ing the boundary after the St. Albans raid of November 1864, 
were so costly that Canadians stopped coming, and the Grand 
Trunk Railway was forced to cancel passenger trains. Passport 
requirements may have had an indirect impact on the volume 
of Canadian freight passing through Portland as w ell.7 
Michael Sheehy, another student of Portland history, summar­
ized that “inimical relations” between the British Empire and 
the United States were hardly in the interests of Portland’s 
development as a railroad center.8
Other historians have argued at length that reciprocity was 
good for the entire state. Maine needed coal, which could be 
supplied from Nova Scotia more economically than from 
Pennsylvania. Wages in Nova Scotia were lower than in 
Pennsylvania, and Nova Scotia was closer to Maine. Local 
industries also needed specialty lumber, flaxseed, building 
stone, and fine wool that could be shipped from British North 
America. Maine was far from American sources of these 
commodities.9
Such arguments were obvious at least to some in the years 
that saw a nationwide debate over reciprocity. In 1864-1865, 
John A. Poor still hoped to make Portland part of the Canadian 
transportation system. His European and North American 
Railroad, stalled for the moment at Bangor, would never reach 
Saint John and Halifax, he feared, without stronger continen­
tal integration. He had supported reciprocity from the begin­
ning, and he continued to support it throughout the 1860s. At 
the request of Portland’s Board of Trade, Poor petitioned Con­
gress to renew the agreement despite the St. Albans raid. An 
economic adviser to Republican Governor Joshua L. Cham­
berlain from 1867 to 1871, Poor gained support from that 
quarter. He and Chamberlain were political pragmatists, well 
aware of the benefits flowing from continental integration.10 
Even opponents of reciprocity, such as Maine Senator Lot M. 
Morrill, admitted that Maine’s railroad interests had benefited 
from the treaty, although he gambled that there would be no 
serious setbacks after the treaty’s demise.11
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John A. Poor, lawyer, rail­
road entrepreneur, and 
ardent supporter of 
Canadian-American reci­
procity. Photo couresy 
MIIS.
I'he meaning of reciprocity for Maine in general was 
apparent in the coalition of economic groups that supported 
continental economic integration. Lumbermen along Maine’s 
boundary rivers, the St. John, the Aroostook, and the St. Croix, 
benefited from cooperation with New Brunswick. Although 
the lumbeimen on these rivers enjoyed special international 
trading privileges that predated, in some cases, the Reciprocity 
Treaty, they reasoned that any disruption of existing relations 
between the two nations could complicate their marketing 
situation.12 Shipbuilders too benefited. As early as 1854. Maine 
Senator William Pitt Fessenden pointed out that Maine’s 
forests were finite, and that Canadian trees could prolong the 
life of the shipbuilding industry after specialty timber had been 
depleted in Maine.13 Reciprocity also permitted Maine’s 
fishermen greater access to the fishing grounds off British 
North America.14 There were ideological arguments for reci­
procity as well. Governor Chamberlain, for instance, main­
tained that free trade promoted economic efficiency. “It seems 
unwise," he said, “to cramp energy with taxes and duties.’’15
hy, then, did so many of Maine's officeholders oppose 
reciprocity, despite the economic benefits it offered Portland 
and other sectors of the economy? The answer lies in the bal- 
anceof economic forces in the state. Abrogation sentiment was
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more than a simple miscalculation; Maine politicians, pres­
sured by powerful lobbies representing major economic 
groups, were torn between competing economic interests in 
this complex and somewhat murky issue. During Maine’s 
debate over continental integration, Portland’s long-term 
interests were neither clearly defined nor forcefully argued, and 
this would have a telling effect on the city’s economy by the end 
of the century.
Several important economic interests were at odds with 
Portland’s business community on the issue of continental 
economic integration. Even though the Reciprocity Treaty 
provided access to rich Canadian fishing grounds, Maine’s 
fishermen, then, as now, did not want to compete with fisher­
men from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland in 
the United States market, as required by the terms of reciproc­
ity.16 Historians have also emphasized the importance of the 
lumber lobby. As far as Bangor’s lumber community was con­
cerned, reciprocity was nothing less than a recipe for 
unemployment.17 The Penobscot and Kennebec lumber indus­
tries suffered a setback during the years reciprocity was in effect, 
and it is hardly surprising that, right or wrong, lumbermen in 
Bangor and Augusta saw a casual connection. As late as 1870, 
Representative James G. Blaine successfully used the reciproc­
ity issue to defeat Chamberlain’s bid for one of Maine’s Senate 
seats. Writing his friend Hannibal Hamlin, Blaine urged the 
former vice-president to remind the loggers of Penobscot 
County that Chamberlain, Poor’s disciple, had supported the 
Reciprocity Treaty. Chamberlain had no chance in the State 
Legislature, which was heavily influenced by the lumberman’s 
lobby.18
Shipbuilders were also opposed to reciprocity. Blaine and 
Frederick A. Pike, Blaine’s Republican colleague in the House 
of Representatives, argued that Maine’s shipbuilders needed 
tariff protection.19 Actually, competition from British-built 
ships was only one of a number of problems besetting Ameri­
can builders. Pike came from Calais on the St. Croix, where 
shipbuilding had been in decline since 1858, a year before
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reciprocity went into effect. The hardships facing Maine’s 
shipbuilding industry are more directly attributable to re­
placement of sail and wood by steam and iron, to overproduc­
tion, to investment in railroads which soaked up available 
capital, and to a shortage of select timber.20 Yet in the 1860s 
competition from Canada-built ships appeared to be the 
immediate danger.
There is evidence that from 1860 onward prominent Maine 
politicians from outside Portland, whether Republican or 
Democrat, believed that reciprocity was more beneficial to 
British North America than to the United States. Wyman B. S. 
Moor, a Democrat from Waterville who had served four terms 
as attorney-general of Maine and briefly as United States Sena­
tor, was consul general in Montreal during the Buchanan 
presidency.21 In that capacity he put national interests ahead of 
local interests. The Grand Trunk Railway, which ran from the 
St. Clair River across from Michigan through Montreal to 
Portland, he argued, was attracting domestic American traffic 
that properly belonged to American railroads.22 In Maine, the 
State Legislature petitioned the national government to abro­
gate the Reciprocity Treaty as quickly as possible. “The great 
interests of this state,” theresolution noted, “ ... are injuriously 
affected by the present treaty.”23 The following year, Governor 
Abner Coburn lauded that action and endorsed the legislature’s 
recommendation.24
Another factor that made abrogation politically accepta­
ble was anglophobia, particularly in Bangor, at that time the 
state’s second largest urban center. According to Edward Chase, 
Bangor’s residents remained embittered by memories of the 
Aroostook War and the ensuing Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 
whereby lands which they thought had been Maine’s were 
declared part of New Brunswick. Ostensibly, Bangor supported 
an eastward extension of the European and North American 
Railroad only because it would assist in the defense of the 
northeastern boundary.
Anglophobia was rife during and after the Civil War. 
Newspaper sentiment in Maine and elsewhere intimated that
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The Grand Trunk terminal, alongside towering grain elevators, symbolized 
the importance of Canadian produce shipments for Portland’s commercial 
economy. Despite Portland's strong ties to the northern country, most Maine 
politicians refused to support the Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty in 
1866. MSH photo.
British business interests were behind the rapid growth of the 
Confederate navy, which harassed Union shipping, increased 
shipping costs, and threatened lives. Maine, an important 
shipping and shipbuilding state, suffered disproportionately.25 
The Portland Daily Advertiser and the Bangor Daily Whig and 
Courier, which had supported the Reciprocity Treaty in 1854, 
criticized British and Canadian behavior after the outbreak of 
the war.26 In 1861 the Advertiser concluded that “the past 
friendship of England has been mere pretense,” and warned 
that “thousands of her people hail with delight the prospect of 
our destruction.” The editor called for greater defense expendi­
tures along the northern border.27 Democratic papers — Port­
land’s Eastern A rgus and The Age of Augusta — endorsed the 
USS San Jacinto’s seizure of Confederate commissioners James 
M. Mason and John Slidell, bound for England aboard the 
British steamer Trent, 28 The Republican Kennebec Journal 
agreed that the incident had been in accordance with interna­
tional law, and suggested that the elitist British government
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was consistent in supporting the Confederacy rather than the 
more democratic Union.29 The Lewiston Evening Journal 
expressed similar sentiments, and the Aroostook Times, pub­
lished at Houlton near the New Brunswick border, accused 
Great Britain and France of showing repeated partiality to the 
“pirates of Jeff Davis.”30
Maine’s politicians responded sharply to British protests 
over the Trent affair. In his annual message in January 1862, 
Governor Israel Washburn again called for greater defense 
expenditures for Portland, citing the British threat. Portland 
was, said Washburn, “at once the Quebec and Halifax of the 
United States.”31 Also concerned about his state’s inland boun­
daries, Washburn recalled that the 1842 Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty surrendered land along the northern border that facili­
tated the movement of British troops from Saint John to the St. 
Lawrence Valley. Many residents of British North America on 
the other side of that long boundary, he regretted, were hostile 
to the United States.32 In March 1864, the State Legislature 
asked the federal government “to provide proper defences for 
the northeastern frontier of Maine.”33
The St. Albans raid of November 1864 and the acquittal of 
the involved Confederate querrillas seemed to confirm British 
North American hostility to northerners. The raid and other 
incidents portrayed British North Americans as either indiffer­
ent to the safety of northern U. S. citizens or outright collabora­
tors in Confederate hostilities. When the Fenian raids took 
place in 1866, there was some smug satisfaction that the British 
North Americans were receiving a taste of their own medi­
cine.34 The British record during the Civil War added pressure 
throughout the United States for the abrogation of reciproc­
ity.35 Maine, exposed to southern raiders along its extensive 
coastline and to supposed British designs along its border with 
Canada, endorsed the national trend.
I n  his annual message to the Maine Legislature, delivered 
January 5, 1865 — barely two months after the St. Albans raid 
— Governor Samuel Cony, a Democrat from Augusta, noted
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with satisfaction that President Abraham Lincoln had recom­
mended the abrogation of reciprocity. Maine’s lumbering and 
agricultural interests had suffered, the governor said.36 Fewer 
than three weeks later, on January 23, the State Legislature 
endorsed the president’s recommendation by approving a reso­
lution that Maine’s senators and representatives in Washing­
ton do what they could to hasten abrogation.37
Before the end of January, Congress passed enabling legis­
lation for the abrogation of reciprocity. House Resolution 56 
authorized President Lincoln “to give the requisite notice for 
terminating the treaty. ’ ’ Four of Maine’s five representatives — 
James G. Blaine, Sidney Perham, Frederick A. Pike, and John 
H. Rice — were among the eighty-five yeas. The fifth, John 
Lynch of the First Congressional District, which included 
Portland, was out of the House at the time of the vote.38 A 
majority of thirty-three senators voted for abrogation, while 
eight voted against, and eight abstained.39 Both of Maine’s 
senators, Nathan A. Farwell and Lot M. Morrill, expressed 
opposition to reciprocity. Farwell cited the need to protect jobs 
in the match industry within Maine, and sought to discourage 
imports from British North America.40 Morrill found reciproc­
ity incompatible with “the interests of my State, with one or 
two exceptions .... ” He minimized the benefits to fishermen 
and argued that the Portland-Montreal rail line would survive 
abrogation.41
During the debate over abrogation, Portland’s own politi­
cians had every opportunity to make their voices heard, but 
they remained curiously silent on the issue. Representative 
James G. Blaine, although a resident of Augusta, had been 
editor of the Portland Daily Advertiser, and no doubt knew his 
readership’s political inclinations. A recent biographer, H. 
Otis Noyes, suggests that Blaine opposed reciprocity for ideo­
logical and personal reasons: he was an anglophobe and owned 
coal fields in Pennsylvania.42 Yet Noyes also points out that 
“Blaine never blazed a trail, or moved far ahead of his consti­
tuency. For him, no issue could be worth a crusade against the 
odds.”43 Blaine, in short, responded to a perceived consensus
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within the Maine electorate, including, no doubt, his Portland
Daily Advertiser readers.
Portland’s own William Pitt Fessenden, senator from 
Maine and Lincoln's secretary of the treasury from July 1864 
until March 1865, was no outspoken advocate of reciprocity. As 
a freshman senator in 1854 Fessenden had voted in favor of the 
Reciprocity Treaty on the grounds that it would be beneficial 
to Maine’s shipbuilding industry.44 Yet as secretary of the 
treasury he was in a position to make his opinion heard in the 
White House, and although he was at odds with Blaine on 
many other issues, he made no effort to oppose Blaine on 
abrogation.45 If he disagreed with presidential policy on the 
matter, he kept his views to himself. The secretary, according to 
one historian, “supported the restrictions of Seward, putting 
the nation ahead of his home city.’’46
The lack of strong support for reciprocity in Portland 
itself seems incongruous with the city’s earlier bid for continen­
tal economic integration. Yet Portlanders were complacent. 
While John Lynch of the First Congressional District absented 
himself from the vote and Fessenden maintained his peace,
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others felt confident that the railroad industry would thrive 
even without reciprocity.
Actually, determining the impact of reciprocity on Port­
land’s rail traffic was not a simple matter in 1865-1866. The 
Reciprocity Treaty in fact had little direct effect on Portland’s 
railroad transportation, for as early as 1845, before construction 
of the Atlantic and St. Lawrence had even begun, the United 
States Congress had passed legislation that allowed goods 
shipped to and from British North America to cross U. S. 
territory free of duty. That, combined with Great Britain’s 
repeal of the Corn Laws the following year, had been stimulus 
enough for construction of the railroad, which became opera­
tional roughly a year before negotiation and implementation 
of the treaty. Duty-free trade entering Portland itself under 
reciprocal agreements accounted for only a small part of Port­
land’s total commerce. In fiscal year 1865, total imports at 
Portland were valued at $7,261,324. Between July 1, 1865, and 
the end of Reciprocity on March 17, 1866, Falmouth and Port­
land combined actually imported only $144,850 in goods 
under the terms of the Reciprocity Treaty.47 This trade consti­
tuted less than 2 percent of the total volume of Portland’s 
commerce, although the treaty was in effect for almost 80 
percent of the fiscal year.
But abrogation would have much more important long­
term effects on Portland. The political alternatives to reciproc­
ity were under discussion in Ottawa even while Maine con­
gressmen were lobbying for abrogation in Washington. On 
February 8, 1865, while American politicians were going 
through the last stages of debate over abrogation, George 
Brown, a leading Liberal from Canada West (now Ontario), 
suggested on the floor of Canada’s Legislative Assembly that 
more than reciprocity was at stake. He warned that Canadian 
bonding privileges at Portland — or anywhere else in the 
United States — might also be insecure.48 Brown and others 
thought that if residents of the St. Lawrence Valley and of 
Canada West wanted year-round access to the Atlantic, they 
ought to build rail lines to Saint John and Halifax via a route 
entirely within British North America.
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In fact, some Portland leaders seemed to appreciate what 
this meant for the city’s carrying trade. When New Brunswick 
elected a government opposed to confederation in 1865, 
Portland’s Eastern Argus was delighted. Without New Bruns­
wick, confederation would not take place; without confedera­
tion, there would be no all-Canadian railroad.49 Nevertheless, 
confederation of four British North American provinces fol­
lowed two years later, and construction of such a railroad was 
one of the terms of the agreement. The all-Canadian Interco­
lonial Railway was operational by 1876, and before the end of 
the century a second Canadian line, the Canadian Pacific 
Railway, was carrying traffic across the north of Maine from 
Montreal to Saint John.
In the years before abrogation, however, the possibility of a 
competing all-Canadian rail line probably did not loom  
large in Maine. Portland considered itself a key piece in the 
Canadian transportation system, and city leaders could not 
foresee the development of the Canadian Pacific Railway or the 
influence which politicians from Saint John would have in 
Ottawa, both to lure federal funds to develop their port and to 
persuade the Canadian government to direct the CPR toward 
Saint John, rather than Portland. That Portlanders could min­
imize the consequences of abrogation, Confederation, and an 
all-Canadian railway is evident from the fact that even after 
Confederation, and indeed after construction of the Intercolon­
ial Railway had begun, Portland businessmen continued to 
pursue their strategy of rail links between Maine and Canada. 
The European and North American Railroad, which con­
nected Portland, Bangor, and Saint John in 1871, involved a 
major grant of state lands and heavy loans from the state and 
the city of Bangor.50 The sacrifice of the state’s last remaining 
public lands was predicated on the assumption that all- 
Canadian rail links to the Atlantic would not appreciably affect 
trade flows through Maine. During the promotional cam­
paigns of the late 1860s, Maine politicians had been easily 
convinced that the publicly financed Intercolonial would never 
be an economically viable alternative to Portland’s harbor.
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Indeed, extensive traffic to and from Montreal was still 
passing through Portland at the turn of the century. By then, 
however, Portland’s commercial position as Canada’s winter 
port, as historian Robert Babcock pointed out in a recent arti­
cle, clearly showed the effects of competition frdm Saint John. 
Babcock indicates that to some extent Portland’s situation was 
due to a self-conscious shift from commerce and industry to 
tourism as a mainstay of the local economy.50 Certainly Port­
land’s decline as a port cannot be attributed to abrogation 
alone, but just as certainly renewed tariff wars and the push for 
an all-Canada transportation system had a marked impact on 
Portland’s trade.
The inconsistencies in Maine thinking about reciprocity 
reflect inconsistencies in a statewide vision of the future in the 
mid-nineteenth centufy. Portland merchants apparently mis­
read the connection between reciprocity and their view of Port­
land’s role in continental economic integration. Bangor lum­
bermen, still firm in their conviction that forest-related 
industries were the key to Maine’s future, were united in their 
opposition to continental economic integration. Although 
some support for reciprocity came from sectors outside Port­
land, M aine’s extensive resource-based industries chafed 
under free trade policies giving Canada access to U. S. markets.
There were good reasons for thinking that reciprocity was 
beneficial, politically and economically. The city of Portland, 
the railroad industry, consumers of coal and other raw prod­
ucts, shipbuilders, fishermen, and perhaps even the lumber 
industry in the St. John and St. Croix valleys all had something 
to gain from it. Other interests, particularly Bangor’s lumber 
industry, opposed reciprocity. Why Bangor’s views prevailed 
over Portland’s vision of Maine’s future is more than an eco­
nomic question. It involved the role of the British North Amer­
ican provinces in the Civil War, Portland’s perception that it 
could survive, even thrive, despite abrogation and Confedera­
tion, and the particular complexion of economic and political 
forces within the state at mid-century. Within Maine, oppo­
nents of reciprocity were more forceful than supporters, and
36
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despite differences of population, the perceived interests of 
Bangor took priority over the perceived interests of Portland.
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